CEO Phil Tseng called it "continued progress in repositioning our portfolio."

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Seven weeks later, the floor fell out. TCPC’s Net Asset Value (NAV) per share went down from $8.71 to $7.07 (an 18.8% decline in a single quarter).

How does a fund destroy nearly a fifth of its book value in ninety days?

The answer is buried in the Schedule of Investments and the accounting mechanics that govern how BDC loan losses actually flow through the books (I hate GAAP accounting with a passion, but what’s a gal to do?)

Today’s story started in 2022, and worked its way through the books for a few years, before running out of road in Q4 2025. Let’s get into it.

(I’ll include a prompt at the end you can use in your own LLM to pull this data from any BDC’s quarterly filings)

👉 I want two things from you: 1. subscribe, - but even more importantly, 2. start reading the footnotes.

The Metric and Its Blind Spots

Non-accrual percentage is the standard BDC credit quality indicator. When a loan stops paying interest, it goes on non-accrual. The percentage tells you what share of the portfolio’s stated value sits in distressed loans. Lower is better.

Here’s the problem with that metric: it’s denominated in fair value (which management marks). As impaired loans (numerator above) get written down toward zero, their weight in the percentage shrinks.

A loan marked at $128K contributes almost nothing to a $1.7B portfolio’s non-accrual percentage, even if $10.6M of original cost basis remains on the books (this, folks, is why you want to compare non-accruals on cost basis, which, for the record, TCP provided along with the FMV).

The metric (as measured by FV) gets better as the damage accumulates and loans get written down further.

Don’t sleep through the next bit, it’s important!

The mechanics work like this:

1️⃣ When a loan goes on non-accrual, the cost basis generally doesn't change (though it can decrease if the borrower is still making payments, or any deferred income like origination discounts gets applied). The Board marks fair value down, and NAV takes the hit from unrealized depreciation.

2️⃣ Cost resets when a restructuring or formal write-off occurs. At that point, the realized loss is recognized on the income statement. But there is no new impact to NAV, because fair value already reflected the loss (in step 1 above).

The unrealized depreciation simply converts into a realized loss, which is why it shows up as simultaneous unrealized gains and realized losses in the same quarter.

Hold this two-step process in your head, we’ll come back to it shortly.

A Story Three Years in the Making

The loans that drove Q4’s collapse had been deteriorating since 2022 and 2023, through multiple markdowns and restructurings.

Management’s own Q4 earnings commentary acknowledged that ~91% of the quarter’s NAV reduction stemmed from investments underwritten in 2021 or earlier.

TCPC’s non-accrual picture during Q4 2024 through Q4 2025 looked like this:

Read more

As a parent of three, I can tell you the third one is always the wildest, because ain’t nobody got time for parenting anymore. (Please do not transpose this observation to private funds. Also, I’m not your mother or financial advisor).

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Cascade Private Capital Fund (CPEFX) an interval fund-of-funds that went from $477 million to $5.3 billion in two years (and it’s still growing). In its four-year life, the fund has had four names and three managers. 85% of the portfolio is valued by NAV practical expedient, and returns are mostly driven by unrealized gains.

If you missed the CCLFX story, start here. It’s the firstborn:

And here’s Cliffwater’s middle child:

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

The Back Story

CPEFX was born in January 2022 as the MassMutual Access Pine Point Fund, a captive vehicle seeded entirely by MassMutual with $74 million of existing PE investments contributed in-kind.

For the next two years, MassMutual owned 100% of the shares, and showed 0% portfolio turnover. The fund cycled through two name changes and a handoff to Barings LLC before Cliffwater took over on February 27, 2024.

👉 At the handoff, net assets stood at ~$477 million. Nineteen months later: $4.25 billion. Here’s what the growth trajectory and returns look like:

Do you see what I see? In FY2025, the fund reported a 31.6% total return (here’s your reminder: high returns do not give you a pass on doing due diligence)

This is yet another “democratized” offering with no income or investor qualification requirements (firm minimum, however, is set at $25M).

This post shows you the mechanics of semi-liquid secondaries funds - it’s a fun one:

What It’ll Cost You

Cliffwater charges a 1.40% management fee on average daily net assets, but waived the entire fee through June 2025 and is charging 1.00% through June 2026.

Good news: that waiver saved LPs $20 million in FY2025.
Bad news: the waiver expires in June of this year.

There's no fund-level incentive fee, which is a meaningful positive. But CPEFX is a fund-of-funds (-of-funds), and here's where the fees live. The underlying PE managers charge their own management fees (1-2%) and carry (typically 10-20%).

The prospectus estimates this at 0.68% annually. ‼️ But read the footnote carefully: that figure excludes performance-based fees on realized gains. The 0.68% is a floor, not a ceiling, friends.

Here’s why you should read footnes (and how to do it without turning murderous):

🔎 What’s in the Fund

Well, I’ll cut to the chase: 23.5% of the portfolio is investments in funds-of-funds (which makes CPEFX’s position a fund-of-funds-of-funds).

Let’s start from the top. As of 2/28/26, CPEFX holds $5.3 billion in assets:

Read more

For years, redemption requests in semi-liquid vehicles ran well below the 5% threshold and were met comfortably, quarter after quarter, because inflows dwarfed outflows, because it was the "golden age of private credit," and because it was cool to brag about your private credit exposure to your golf buddies.

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Then we heard about some "cockroaches," rapidly followed by "AI will eat software companies" and how those SaaS borrowers won't be able to repay the debt. And all of a sudden, direct lending is not so cool anymore.

I mean, when you have John Zito, co-president of Apollo's asset management arm, arguing that many private market participants are overly confident and stating "I literally think all the marks are wrong", — you should probably listen. (WSJ)

And listen investors did. (Turns out, many of them listened by requesting redemptions)

This quarter, the structural mismatch between illiquid assets and the “semi-liquid” nature of evergreen vehicles stopped being theoretical, as investors rushed for the exits.

Thousands of wealth advisors faced the same decision independently:

• submit a redemption request for their clients’ interval fund holdings,

• or hold.

If only I hadn’t warned you…

Next quarter, advisers who didn't face this decision will certainly hear from more of their clients, and will face it again. But therein lies a problem: if everyone holds, the fund operates smoothly. If everyone wants to redeem, gates slam shut.

👉 Here’s how that works:

To add a complication: advisers don’t know what others are doing, while at the same time being bound by a fiduciary duty to their client (not to the fund's stability, and certainly not to the other advisers' clients).

Welcome to the prisoner’s dilemma. Semi-liquid edition.

(Please note: this dynamic is a whole separate issue from asset quality. It’s driven by the structure of the vehicle and investor behavior. For now, there’s little evidence of broad deterioration of underlying loans, but if asset quality does weaken, it will only accelerate the dynamic)

First, some context

Semi-liquid private market funds (interval funds, tender offer funds, non-traded BDCs and REITs) have gone from niche to nearly $500 billion in AUM, with assets growing over 30% in the twelve months through September 2025 alone. The private wealth channel now represents roughly one-fifth of total evergreen fund AUM.

The pitch is compelling: access to inherently illiquid assets through structures that offer periodic liquidity in the form of quarterly redemptions, typically at NAV.

For advisers managing client portfolios, these are dramatically simpler than traditional drawdown funds. No capital calls. No J-curve. Full allocation from day one, and option to compound via reinvesting distributions.

The industry responded with gusto: more than 120 evergreen funds were launched in 2025, and 30 so far this year:

The problem is that the “periodic liquidity” part is somewhat reliant on collective cooperation.

Today we’re talking about private credit semi-liquid funds (specifically, direct lending PC), since this is the topic du jour.

❗️And I’ll say this: of the universe of options, private credit is the asset class best suited for the semi-liquid structure:

• high yield,

• high portfolio turnover (20–30% organically pays off every year),

• relatively short tenor on assets (loans are typically originated with 5–7 year terms, and many pay off before maturity).

Compare that to, say, a fund-of-funds investing in secondary PE stakes: virtually no yield, minimal organic portfolio turnover. The asset-liability mismatch is far worse.

Compare to this fund, for example:

Or this one:

And yet even in the best case, the structure has a game theory problem.

The game

Every quarter, each adviser independently chooses: hold or redeem.

The outcomes depend on what everyone else does, but there is only one rational course of action:

Read more

Every other week, we send a quick digest on what’s catching our eye across private markets (the data, the drama, and the stuff LPs should actually care about).

Today’s lineup:

1️⃣ Private equity: AI is coming to private equity, and Carlyle is engineering an exit
2️⃣ Private credit: S&P cuts CCLFX's outlook, a Morgan Stanley fund caps redemptions, and BCRED posts its first monthly loss in three years
3️⃣ Commercial real estate: BREIT records net inflows for the first time since 2022, and the private credit exodus may be sending capital back to real estate

Before we dive in:

Accredited Insight delivers the LP’s perspective on private credit, private equity, and CRE, drawing on hundreds of deals, and thousands of conversations. Paid subscribers gain access to our database of over 40 case studies and articles on everything from evergreen funds to due diligence.

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1️⃣ Private Equity

TL;DR:

• OpenAI and Anthropic are coming to PE

• Carlyle is structuring a multibillion-dollar deal, and it looks like a collateralized fund obligation.

1. OpenAI Wants PE to Be Its Enterprise Sales Force

OpenAI is negotiating a $10 billion joint venture with four private equity firms (TPG as anchor, Advent International, Bain Capital, and Brookfield) to distribute its enterprise AI products across their portfolio companies (Reuters). Equity commitments would be $4 billion.

Anthropic, is allegedly in similar talks with Blackstone, Permira, and Hellman & Friedman. (Bloomberg).

Carlyle’s Answer to the Exit Drought via CFO

Carlyle is building what could be the largest collateralized fund obligation-style transaction on record (Bloomberg). The deal would seed Carlyle Partners IX, while simultaneously paying back investors in older funds.

The mechanics: investors in prior funds transfer their holdings into a new vehicle that provides them with equity and some cash. That vehicle then invests in the new fund.

Here’s a sample CFO structure from Mayer Brown:

The financing combines senior debt, preferred shares, and common equity, with Carlyle retaining a significant minority equity stake.

A few unusual features: no credit rating (atypical for structures that need to attract insurance capital), large amounts of preferred shares (atypical for CFOs), and it’s being structured by AlpInvest, Carlyle’s own secondaries platform. What are the odds this will make its way to some secondaries evergreen funds?

➡️ When GPs start building their own structured products to manufacture liquidity, you know the exit backlog is a problem. Co-President John Redett acknowledged that the seventh flagship fund was “not our best work of art,” though distributions have improved. The eighth fund is 80% committed and invested. Project Potomac will hold stakes in both.

👉 Invest in PE? Read this:

2️⃣ Private Credit

TL;DR:

• S&P cuts CCLFX’s outlook to negative after record 14% redemption requests

• Morgan Stanley’s North Haven fund capped at 5%, returning less than half of what investors requested

• BCRED posts its first monthly loss since September 2022

1. S&P Cuts Cliffwater’s Outlook

What a change in two weeks: in the last issue, we flagged CCLFX’s repurchase deadline as the one to watch. Since then: investors submitted redemption requests of ~14% of shares (a record for the fund).

Cliffwater capped repurchases at 7% (the max without changing fund terms), meaning roughly half of investors who wanted out didn’t get out. For more, read this:

S&P affirmed the A rating but revised the outlook to negative (link), citing the risk that elevated redemptions and above-minimum repurchases could become the norm.

Separately (or maybe relatedly?), CCLFX was also reportedly in the secondary market looking to sell approximately $1 billion in loan assets from the fund (PitchBook).

2. Morgan Stanley Joins the Club

Morgan Stanley’s $7.6 billion North Haven Private Income Fund received redemption requests totaling approximately 10.9% of shares in Q1 2026.

The fund enforced its 5% quarterly cap, returning roughly $169 million, or ~45.8% of what investors asked for (Reuters and Morningstar).

👉 Need to understand how gating actually works?

3. BCRED’s First Monthly Loss in Three Years

Blackstone’s $83 billion BCRED posted a -0.4% total return in February, its first monthly decline since September 2022 (FT). Performance is flat year-to-date after an 8% gain in 2025.

The fund “wrote down the value of a “select” number of loans during the month, including the debt it extended to customer service software company Medallia”, reported FT.

Meanwhile, Q1 redemption requests hit approximately $3.7 billion (~8% of assets). Blackstone upsized its repurchase offer and put in $400 million of its own capital (including $150M from employees) to cover the gap

Before we move on: both CCLFX and BCRED use sale/buyback agreements. Worth understanding if you’re trying to make sense of how these funds manage liquidity.

3️⃣ Commercial Real Estate

TL;DR:

• BREIT records net inflows for the first time since 2022

• Capital may be rotating from private credit into CRE

• CRE debt markets are funded but selective

1. BREIT is Back, baby!

Blackstone’s $55 billion BREIT raised $1 billion more than it paid out in redemptions in 2025 - first net inflows since September 2022 (Bisnow). The fund’s net return on I Shares was over 8% last year.

➡️ This is interesting: BREIT is offering 1% bonus shares (funded by Blackstone, non-dilutive to existing holders) for new subscriptions through April 1.

2. The Private Credit → CRE Rotation

Here’s another interesting tidbit: as capital exits private credit funds, some of it appears to be flowing back into real estate.

Non-traded REIT capital formation went from $33.2 billion in 2022 to $5.7 billion in 2025, but recent months suggest a reversal. BREIT’s February net inflows (the first positive month in nearly four years) are one data point. As Willy Walker (CEO of Walker & Dunlop) put it: private credit funds dwarf CRE debt funds (trillions versus billions) so even a modest rotation could have a material impact on CRE capital flows (CNBC).

👉 Real estate people, you are going to love this icymi:

P.S. New here?

After 2 years of publishing, we got around to creating a table of contents 😅:

Thanks for reading! As always, if you have any suggestions, reply to this email, leave a comment, or find me on socials (unhinged me on X, or come troll me - intelligently - on LinkedIn)
-Leyla

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What you won’t expect to find (40 pages deep in Exhibit C-1) is this:

The fund’s largest investment, a 3,500-home single-family rental portfolio, has generated negative operating cash flow for three consecutive years (as far as I looked).

• 2025: -$5.6M

• 2024: -$10.7M

• 2023: -$9.1M

This portfolio accounts for ~46% of the fund’s value.

👉 For more on interval funds and how they work:

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What We’ll Cover Today

1️⃣ How the fund is structured (and why it’s so important to look at JV financials)
2️⃣ The operating performance of its largest investment
3️⃣ The debt stack (including a near-term maturity)
4️⃣ How the valuations get from a 3.3% cap rate on current NOI to the 5.3% cap rate the fund uses to mark the portfolio

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. The views expressed are solely those of the author. All examples are illustrative in nature and not guarantees of future outcomes. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult with qualified professionals before making any investment or financial decisions.

👉 If you invest in real estate, you’ll want to start with our How to Read a Pro Forma series

Why Look at a JV?

First, some context on the fund itself. The Fundrise Real Estate Interval Fund (~$1.2B net assets) is a closed-end interval fund that invests in private real estate through co-investment joint ventures with Fundrise affiliates. Roughly 95% of assets are in these co-investment JVs.

Here’s another example of a real estate fund of funds:

Since fund-level financials are so simple, you can figure everything out yourself, right? Keep in mind, the income below is annualized, in $’000s, NAV is $1.2B.

And in case this doesn’t tell you the story, let me help you out: the fund generated $1.3M of investment income. It then paid $10.2M in management fees, $5.7M in marketing, and other platform and professional fees. The increase in net assets is mostly from unrealized gains. It’s really not worth digging into this one any further.

Back to the FAR more interesting subject: the JV, and what its financials look like:

Read more

And some of the most interesting financing structures are buried in footnotes that almost nobody reads (the one thing I want to sell you even more than a subscription is an appreciation for footnotes).

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Before we get any further, I sorted and organized all content for your enjoyment:

Today: repurchase agreements and sale/buyback facilities. Don’t recoil and run away: they’re not as complicated as they sound. But they do fall squarely into the category of things you need to understand.

We will look into how two of the largest private credit funds in the market are using these tools right now (one of them uses both).

These are the two funds, both happen to use such facilities:

📺 Quick detour: I went on live TV to talk about what’s happening in private credit more broadly. If you missed it, it’s here:
https://video.foxbusiness.com/v/6391029463112

Disclosure: This article is provided for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. The views expressed are solely those of the author. All analysis is based on publicly available SEC filings and third-party research cited herein; the author has no position in, and receives no compensation from, any fund, counterparty, or entity discussed. Fund structures, leverage facilities, and borrowing terms are presented as reported in the referenced filings and may have changed since the filing dates noted. All examples are illustrative in nature and not guarantees of future outcomes. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult with qualified professionals before making any investment or financial decisions.

📌 A Quick Primer on Repo and Sale/Buybacks

At a high level, these do the same thing.

A fund “sells” an asset to a bank and, at the same time, agrees to buy it back later at a slightly higher price. That price difference is the financing cost. The fund gets cash; the bank gets collateral.

Economically, it’s a secured loan.

So what’s the difference?

Read more

1. Fund Deep Dives (analysis of individual 1940 act funds)

Read more

👉 If you missed the original deep dive, start here:

The pitch was simple: access to private credit, 9.5% annualized returns, 1% management fee, no performance fee (and no minimum investor qualifications). Capital was pouring in. The machine was eating.

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Last week, the machine got indigestion.

Bloomberg reported that investors requested redemptions of approximately 14% of CCLFX shares in Q1 2026. That’s a record for the fund.

Cliffwater capped repurchases at 7%. Half the investors who wanted out didn’t get out.

In a letter to shareholders, CEO Stephen Nesbitt said the fund’s performance “remains strong”: annualized return of ~9.4% since inception, a “historical track record of near zero percent in realized losses,” and liquidity at 21% of NAV.

I don’t doubt the return number.

What I want to do today is something different: I want to look forward. The fund expects ~$3B in new capital this quarter (per FT), which means Q1 is manageable: new shares in, old shares out.

👉 This younger sibling’s repurchase offer deadline is on 3/18. Something to watch..

But what happens if the new money slows down?

And the answer comes down to three interconnected factors:

• The fund’s leverage (including off-balance-sheet CLO and PIV positions), and how reported leverage compares to the fund’s effective leverage

• $11B of unfunded commitments

• The regulatory leverage limit

Before we get any further, take a look at the inflows into the fund. The orange line is net share transactions as % of fund’s total fair market value (FMV), bars represent share transactions in $m.

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational and informational purposes only and should not be construed as investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. The views expressed are solely those of the author. All examples are illustrative in nature and not guarantees of future outcomes. Readers should conduct their own independent research and consult with qualified professionals before making any investment or financial decisions.

Four Ways to Meet Redemptions

When an interval fund gets a redemption request, it has four ways to come up with the cash:

1️⃣ Cash on hand
2️⃣ New share sales (new investors in, old investors out, both at NAV)
3️⃣ Asset repayments and sales (selling loans or receiving paydowns)
4️⃣ Increasing leverage (borrowing more against the portfolio)

Let’s start with #1 and look at where the fund stood as of the last filing (September 30, 2025):

Translation: the fund ended September with $812M in cash and short-term securities on a $31.5B net asset base. That’s 2.58% of NAV.

That’s not going to cover a 7% repurchase on its own.

Source #2 (new share sales) is what’s keeping the fund liquid right now. The roughly $3B in expected Q1 inflows covers the 7% repurchase with room to spare. But this is the source most vulnerable to sentiment (I’m quoted in this WSJ article on this topic). If investors see a fund gating redemptions at 7% while 14% wanted out, the pipeline of new money may not look the same in Q2.

Source #3 (asset repayments and sales). Historically, the fund's portfolio has turned over at roughly 24% annually, which means ~$9.7B in natural loan repayments, refinancings, and sales per year (that’s ~$2.4B per quarter).

A 7% quarterly redemption is roughly $2.2B, so in theory, organic portfolio turnover alone nearly covers a max redemption quarter without the fund having to fire-sell anything.

But there are two catches:

1. 24% is a historical average. In a tightening credit market, refinancing activity would slow, prepayments drop, and we can expect that $9.7B number to shrink.

2. Every dollar of repayment the fund uses to cover redemptions is a dollar it can't reinvest into new loans. That shrinks total assets, which brings us to the next point.

Watch liquidity, friends. I’m not kidding:

The Leverage Picture

Let’s talk about source #4, borrowing capacity.

Between March and September 2025, total borrowings jumped from $6.7B to $9.8B (a 45% increase in six months). During the same period, total assets grew 18.5%.

In other words, the fund was borrowing faster than it was growing.

CCLFX maintains a senior secured credit facility to fund lending commitments and new investments. As of September 30, 2025:

Read more

Investors are starting to gallop out of evergreen private credit funds. Several large vehicles have recently bumped up against their redemption limits.

• HLEND gated redemptions (after receiving requests equal to 9.3% of NAV)

• BCRED saw redemption requests exceed 7% of NAV (though it met them)

• CCLFX capped redemptions at 7% (after investors sought to redeem ~14% of shares)

Speaking of CCLFX, stay tuned for an update on that fund, meanwhile, read this:

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Evergreen structures were designed to solve a real problem: how to package inherently illiquid assets into a format that feels accessible to a retired dentist in Oklahoma. The industry solution came with a convenient label: “semi-liquid.”

Now I can hear the argument forming inside your head: “Investors were explicitly told these funds limit liquidity.”

Technically, that’s true.

I’d be curious how many investors (and advisers) actually understood gating provisions before hitting one. If that sounds fuzzy, here’s a quick primer:

For years, while markets were cooperative, gating felt like a theoretical risk reserved for doomsayers. Especially in private credit, where loans amortize and generate steady cash flow. Liquidity almost felt built into the asset class.

Well, those assumptions are about to be tested.

What options do investors have once gates close?

⚰️ Some funds will prioritize redemptions for deceased investors. But death is a bit of an extreme exit strategy.

Sometimes another path appears: secondary tender offers.

Today, we’ll:

• Evaluate the OBDC II portfolio post-sale

• Estimate potential outcomes for remaining investors (and what’s in it for the party making the offer)

• And answer the key question: what does liquidity actually cost in evergreen private credit funds?

Here’s how you can check financials to assess fund’s liquidity (not to gloat, but the timing was 🤌):

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

What's Going On With OBDC II?

If you missed the prior episodes, here’s a quick recap:

Blue Owl Capital Corporation II (OBDC II) is a non-traded business development company managed by Blue Owl Capital. As of December 31, 2025, the fund had ~$1.6B in total investments at fair value, a NAV of $8.27 per share, and ~114.9 million shares outstanding.

After a cancelled attempt to merge with its publicly traded sibling (OBDC), Blue Owl is winding down the fund. They sold $600M of the fund's best loans, declared a $2.50/share special distribution (about 30% of NAV), and plan to return 50%+ of capital to shareholders over the course of 2026.

Now enter Saba Capital and Cox Capital Partners. On March 6th, they announced a tender offer for OBDC II shares at $3.80 per share for up to 8 million shares (6.9% of outstanding shares in the fund)

The offer price represents a 34.9% discount to the post-distribution NAV of ~$5.84.

Now the fun part, let’s do the math on the remaining portfolio and game-play scenarios for investors:

Read more

Every other week, we send a quick digest on what’s catching our eye across private markets (the data, the drama, and the stuff LPs should actually care about).

Chart of the day (I’ll explain later, keep reading):

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Today’s lineup:

1️⃣ Private equity: $1.3 trillion in dry powder, and PE comes to your brokerage account
2️⃣ Private credit: the golden age is over. The question is, can you leave voluntarily?
3️⃣ Commercial real estate: a AAA bond recovers 58 cents, and extend-and-pretend might never end

Before we dive in:

Accredited Insight delivers the LP’s perspective on private credit, private equity, and CRE, drawing on hundreds of deals, and thousands of conversations. Paid subscribers gain access to our database of over 40 case studies and articles on everything from evergreen funds to due diligence.

Subscribe now

1️⃣ Private Equity

TL;DR:

• The K-shaped recovery in PE: deal value surged but only the mega-funds are eating

• $1.3 trillion of dry powder, and a surge in CVs

• Capital Group and KKR just launched a PE interval fund for retail investors with a $1,000 minimum

Bain dropped its 17th annual Global Private Equity Report

Buyout deal value hit $904 billion in 2025, up 44% year-over-year. Exit value jumped 47% to $717 billion. Second-best year ever on both counts.

Fundraising remains flat (down 30% from 2023 peaks). Why? Distributions to LPs as a percentage of NAV have been stuck below 15% for four consecutive years (industry record). LPs are tapped out: when distributions aren’t coming, LPs don’t make new commitments.

It would be very interesting to find out how many institutional LPs are having trouble coming up with liquidity to meet capital calls on prior commitments - has anyone seen this data?

The industry is sitting on 32,000 unsold companies worth $3.8 trillion. Holding periods at exit now average around seven years, up from five to six during the 2010s.

Continuation vehicles continue to fill the gap. GP-led CV volume grew 62% year-over-year. Secondary deal volume (GP- and LP-led combined) rose 41%.

➡️ Bain’s big thesis this year: “12 is the new 5.” In the 2010s, a typical deal needed ~5% annual EBITDA growth to hit a 2.5x return over five years. Today, with borrowing costs at 8–9%, leverage ratios at 30–40%, and purchase multiples at record highs, that same return requires 10–12% annual EBITDA growth. The math is A LOT harder.

👉What drives returns in PE deals:

2. Capital Group + KKR: PE Comes to Your Brokerage Account

The retailification of private equity continues.

On March 3, Capital Group and KKR launched Capital Group KKR U.S. Equity+, the first public-private equity interval fund from their partnership. (The two firms already rolled out two credit interval funds in 2025).

The structure: roughly 60% in actively managed large-cap US equities, up to 40% in KKR’s private equity strategies. A truly “democratized” product: no accreditation required, and $1k minimum. This, friends, is an interval fund, with limited quarterly liquidity.

👉 Yes, you need to know how gating provisions work:

2️⃣ Private Credit

TL;DR:

• BlackRock just gated redemptions at its $26B HPS fund (the first time since inception)

• Blackstone met record $3.8B in redemptions at BCRED (but had to step in with its own capital)

Dare I say it? We have begun testing the limits of semi-liquid structures.

Here’s your primer on evergreen vehicles:

The Gates Are Going Up

Turns out, the OBDC II saga was the opening act. Last week we got the main event.

On Friday, BlackRock disclosed that investors in the $26 billion HPS Corporate Lending Fund (HLEND) requested redemptions of 9.3% of shares, roughly $1.2 billion (LINK). Management capped repurchases at 5%, paying out approximately $620 million. It’s the first time requests have breached the 5% threshold since the fund’s inception.

BLK stock dropped ~8%. KKR and Ares sold off in sympathy.

Three days earlier, Blackstone reported that investors requested a record 7.9% of shares from BCRED, its $82 billion flagship credit fund (~$3.8 billion). Blackstone upsized its quarterly repurchase offer from 5% to 7%, then the firm and its employees collectively put in ~$400 million to cover the rest ($250M came from the firm, $150M - from employees).

Investment bank RA Stanger is now forecasting a ~40% year-over-year decline in BDC capital formation for 2026. If accurate, that would be the most severe fundraising contraction in the sector’s modern history.

👉 Invest in private credit? Here’s how you can learn to read the statements:

→The one to watch this week is CCLFX: the repurchase offer deadline for Q4 is 3/10/26.

3️⃣ Commercial Real Estate

• CMBS bondholders just lost $139 million on a single San Francisco office tower

• The February Trepp data for office delinquencies looks better, after hitting an all-time high of 12.34% in January. But don’t pop the champagne yet

The February CMBS delinquency rate fell 33 bps to 7.14%, but it was driven by modifications and extensions on a handful of large office and mall loans, not by borrowers actually paying off debt.

Extend and pretend is alive and well. The rate is 8.75% including loans past maturity but current on interest.

How to Lose Money in a AAA-rated Security, a Short Tutorial

A $240 million single-asset, single-borrower (SASB) CMBS tied to 600 California Street in San Francisco just liquidated at roughly 58 cents on the dollar (generating losses of 42 cents). Six junior tranches were wiped out entirely. The second-most senior bonds, originally rated AA- by S&P and AAA by Morningstar, lost more than 40% of principal (Bloomberg).

Back in 2019, the building was appraised at $349 million when WeWork Capital Advisors acquired it. By the time the loan was sold to Lone Star Funds in December for about $123 million, the property was only 26% leased 🤕

This is not a one-off, either. Bloomberg flagged that top-ranked SASB tranches tied to Peachtree Center (Atlanta), EY Plaza (Los Angeles), and River North Point (Chicago) all trade below 80 cents on the dollar. Lower tranches at far steeper discounts.

Why should LPs care? If you’re in a fund that holds SASB paper, the rating on the bond you bought may have very little relationship to the recovery you’ll actually receive. (58 cent recovery on a bond rated AAA is quite something, isn’t it?)

P.S. New here?

Check out some of our popular topics to get started: on private credit, private equity, and commercial real estate.

Thanks for reading! As always, if you have any suggestions, reply to this email, leave a comment, or find me on socials (unhinged me on X and an increasingly unbothered me on LinkedIn)
-Leyla

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“Show me the incentive, and I’ll show you the outcome” - Charlie Munger

Today’s post is about one thing: how a small change in incentives can move tens of millions of dollars from LPs to the fund manager (without a single asset being sold).

Tim McGlinn of will walk you through a real-life example with Hamilton lane. I (Leyla) will tell you the moral of the story.

I’m going to explain this very simply, and I want you to do me a favor and forward this explanation to everyone you know: it’s truly that important.

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1️⃣ Primary Fund

Let’s start simple. Bob buys two rental properties for $1 million.

After attending a guru seminar in a hotel conference room, Bob learns he can wrap those properties into a fund. He’ll earn:

• A 1% annual management fee

• A 10% incentive fee

So Bob forms Fund I and sells the $1 million of equity to four investors at $250,000 each.

A year goes by, nothing has been sold. But Bob marks the properties up to $1.25 million. For simplicity, assume operating income covered expenses, so the entire $250,000 increase is unrealized gains.

That was a trick question. It depends entirely on how the incentive fee is defined in the documents.

Bob has options. His legal team can draft the fund document so that incentive fees are calculated on:

• Income only

• Realized gains + income

• Total return, including unrealized gains

If the incentive is based on realized gains only? Bob makes $0. Nothing was sold (he does accrue “incentive fee payable”, but will only get paid when the properties sell).

If the incentive is based on total return including unrealized gains? Bob’s Fund I makes 10% × $250,000 = $25,000, which will be paid out that year.

(And yes, Bob earns his 1% management fee either way)

Another (rhetorical) question: what structure do you think Bob prefers?

👉 If you invest in private markets, read the darn footnotes, you’ll find the basis for the incentive and AUM fees in said footnotes. Here’s how I do it (I’ll even give you AI prompts to get you started):

2️⃣ Secondary Fund

We’re now going to introduce a complication into Bob’s Fund I.

One of Bob’s investors, Janet, wants out. She finds a willing buyer for her $250,000 stake, and sells it to Herbert for $200,000 - after a round of price negotiations.

This, folks, is called “the secondary market”.

“Leyla, WTF are secondary funds?” — Here you go:

Herbert runs a fund-of-funds (FOF). His FOF charges:

• 1.25% management fee

• 12.5% incentive fee

He buys Janet’s stake at $200K, - a 20% discount to the underlying $250K NAV.

⚠️ I’m about to introduce an accounting sleight of hand into this conversation, so PAY ATTENTION, pretty please.

Herbert’s accounting team will use NAV as practical expedient (under rule ASC 820) to mark the value of this investment on Herbert’s FOF books. The very next day, they mark the investment to the reported NAV of Bob’s Fund I: $250,000.

In other words:

• Purchase price: $200,000

• Book value on Day 2: $250,000

• Unrealized gain: $50,000

Nothing changed economically in 24 hours. But on paper, Herbert’s FOF now shows a $50K gain.

Do I need to run another poll, or do you already know how much Herbert’s FOF will earn on this investment in the same quarter they bought it?

🧮 If his incentive fee includes unrealized gains: 12.5% × $50,000 = $6,250

(Plus the 1.25% AUM fee)

That $6,250 is incentive income generated the same quarter the investment was purchased. This is what people mean when they talk about “crystallized carry.”

👉 Many funds charge incentive fees on unrealized gains. Here are some examples:

Others do not:

CCLFX, for example, doesn’t have a performance fee at all. CollerCredit explicitly excludes capital gains and NAV appreciation. More case studies here.

Now that you understand the mechanics, I’ll give the wheel to Tim, so he can show you what happens when this playbook runs with real money.

Hamilton Lane PAF (by Tim McGlinn)

Hamilton Lane’s Private Assets Fund (PAF) is a $5.6 billion registered ‘40 Act fund launched in September 2020 that gives retail and wealth channel investors access to private equity primarily through:

• secondary fund stakes (buying LP interests at a discount to NAV) — 46% of total assets

• direct equity co-investments — 42% of total assets, as of 9/30/25.

The fund has grown rapidly, powered in large part by a strategy aptly called “NAV squeezing” (FT wrote about this HERE): buying secondary stakes at 70–90 cents on the dollar, then immediately marking them up to full NAV under fair value accounting rules, producing instant (but unrealized) gains. (Remember our discussion about Herbert’s FOF?)

The PAF’s original set up:

Read more

Today’s case study focuses instead on Blue Owl’s Technology Income Corp (OTIC), a widely distributed BDC that has raised billions over the past few years.

We’ll cover the usual:

• What’s actually in the portfolio (stats on borrowers, ARR loans, unitranche, etc)

• How the fund makes money (and whether distributions are covered by cash net investment income), and the fee structure

• What fundraising and redemptions have looked like - and, most importantly, what to watch.

There are also some interesting tidbits:

• Unitranche loans
  ❓WHY is nobody talking about them? Here’s your primer:

• “Second lien senior secured” debt (senior to what? third lien? equity?)

• And, my personal favorite: an LP investment in a Thoma Bravo Regulation D vehicle sitting on the books:

As one social media commenter said:
🎶 “Relax,” said the PM, “we are programmed to receive… You can check the IRR anytime you like — but you can never leave.” 🎶

If you missed OBDC II story, it’s worth reading:

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

The Pitch

Blue Owl Technology Income Corp. (formerly Owl Rock Technology Income Corp.) is a non-traded business development company formed in June 2021 and managed by Blue Owl Technology Credit Advisors II LLC, an affiliate.

It filed its first quarterly report in 1Q22 with $151 million in assets. As of 9/30/25, net assets stood at $3.3 billion.

The mandate is straightforward: invest at least 80% of total assets in “technology-related” companies. In practice, that means predominantly senior secured lending to software and tech-enabled businesses.

👉 Here’s why you want to watch liqidity. Like a hawk:

Fees

1️⃣ Base Management Fee

1.25% annually, calculated monthly in arrears, based on the average net assets over the prior two months.

For the nine months ended 9/30/25:

👉 Management fees totaled ~$30.3 million (net of a ~$40k waiver tied to an affiliated consulting arrangement).

2️⃣ Performance Based Incentive Fee

12.5% of pre-incentive fee net investment income.

There is a hurdle:
A 1.25% quarterly preferred return (5% annualized) on NAV.

There’s also a catch-up provision: between 1.25% and 1.43% quarterly return, the Adviser receives 100% of incremental income. After that, the 12.5% split resumes.

For the nine months ended 9/30/25:

👉 Income incentive fees totaled ~$31.7 million.

3️⃣ Capital Gains Incentive Fee

12.5% of cumulative realized capital gains, net of all realized capital losses and unrealized depreciation.

For the nine months ended September 30, 2025:

👉 Capital gains incentive fees: ~$110,000 (of that, $1.4M in Q3).

❗️The capital gains fee is accrued on unrealized gains but not paid until gains are realized. That’s more conserviative than some funds we’ve covered.

4️⃣ Servicing Fees (The Share-Class Tax)

Before we get into the weeds, let me remind you that you need to read footnotes:

🔎 What’s in the Fund

OTIC is predominantly a first-lien senior secured lender to technology and software companies. Here's the breakdown:

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The dirty word in the world of semi-liquid funds.

Nobody notices them when things go well, but when things go south, investors view gates as a lifeboat with a wait list.

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Today we’ll talk about:

• what gating provisions are,

• how they work across different fund structures,

• and where to find them in the documents you signed.

We’ll use two real-world examples, Blue Owl’s OBDC II and Blackstone’s BREIT, to show how gates play out in practice, and why the language around “liquidity” can mean very different things depending on who’s talking.

Let’s start with the freshest example.

You’ve seen the headlines. You may have also seen Blue Owl’s statement (emphasis mine):

“Contrary to what has been reported, we are not halting investor liquidity in OBDC II. In fact, we are accelerating the return of capital.”

And that may have left you hooting scratching your head.

Some headlines were correct. Redemptions were halted. But liquidity was not.

Those are not the same thing. Let me explain.

OBDC II is a closed-end, finite-life fund: it stopped selling shares back in April 2021. The plan was to provide a liquidity event to investors 3–4 years after that date (via merger, IPO, or asset sale).

During the life of the fund, the manager utilized quarterly tender offers: each quarter, they would offer to repurchase up to 5% of the fund’s outstanding NAV from shareholders. As long as aggregate demand didn’t exceed 5% of NAV.

From the fund manager’s standpoint: they liquidated 5% of the fund’s NAV quarterly.

From the investor’s standpoint: you liquidated 100% of your position.

The change announced on February 18 means the fund will no longer offer to repurchase your shares through quarterly tender offers. Instead, the fund sold $600 million of direct lending investments at 99.7% of fair value and will return approximately 30% of investors’ capital to all shareholders on a pro rata basis, within 45 days.

From LP standpoint: you get 30% of your money back, whether you asked for it or not.

From the fund’s standpoint: they liquidated 30% of the fund’s NAV (six times the size of the 5% quarterly tender offer they replaced).

Blue Owl’s framing is worth reading carefully. They’re not wrong: “Instead of resuming a 5% quarterly tender — under which only tendering investors would receive a partial return of capital — we are distributing an amount six times greater and returning capital to all shareholders.”

That is, mechanically, accurate.

But let’s also be precise about what changed. Under the old structure, an investor who wanted full liquidity could get it (100% of their position) as long as aggregate demand didn’t exceed 5% of NAV.

Under the new structure, every investor gets 30%, but no investor can choose to get 100%. The door is wider, but you no longer get to decide how far you walk through it.

When do you get the rest? Blue Owl says the Board “intends to prioritize quarterly return of capital distributions going forward”. Note there is no timeline.

And OBDC II is hardly the only example. Remember BREIT? In late 2022, Blackstone’s $69 billion non-traded REIT hit its redemption limits, and gated the fund.

👉 Speaking of non-traded REITs. Here’s how valuation of assets works:

🔎 What IS a Gating Provision?

At its core, a gating provision is a contractual or regulatory mechanism that limits the amount of capital investors can withdraw from a fund during a specified period.

That’s it. That’s the concept.

They exist across virtually every private fund structure that provides periodic liquidity (from ’40 Act interval funds to Reg D evergreen vehicles), and they all serve the same fundamental purpose:

Protect the remaining investors from forced asset sales when too many people head for the exits at once.

When you, LP, wire money to a fund, you are handed a stack of documents you are supposed to read and sign. Somewhere in that stack (between the fee disclosures and the tax representations) is a warning about how illiquid your investment actually is.

👉 No post would be complete without me pounding you on the head about reading financial statements (and notes to said statements):

The fund can call itself evergreen, open-ended, whatever. Every prospectus will warn you: liquidity is conditional.

How conditional? That depends on the fund structure, regulatory framework, drafting of the governing documents. This is what we’ll talk about today.

Think of it this way: if the liquidity mechanism is the door, the gate determines

• How many people can walk through it at once

• Whether there’s a line

• And under what conditions the door gets locked entirely

(And as with most exit doors, people tend to rush them at the same time.)

Gates come in several flavors (cue Coldplay’s “nooooobody said it was easyyy”🎶):

Read more

Every other week, we send a quick digest on what’s catching our eye across private markets (the data, the drama, and the stuff LPs should actually care about).

Today’s lineup:

1️⃣ Private equity: record buyout multiples, surging continuation vehicles, and a steady push into 401(k)s
2️⃣ Private credit: good grief, where do I begin?? OBDC II eliminates redemptions just as semi-liquid credit vehicles boom (Defaults look contained, kind of)
3️⃣ Commercial real estate: the 2026 maturity tsunami looms, refinancing math is tight, but core funds are stabilizing… while capital still walks out the door.

Before we dive in:

Accredited Insight delivers the LP’s perspective on private credit, private equity, and CRE, drawing on hundreds of deals, and thousands of conversations. Paid subscribers gain access to our database of over 40 case studies and articles on everything from evergreen funds to due diligence.

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1️⃣ Private Equity

TL;DR:

• Buyout multiples are at record highs (margin for error is getting thinner)

• Secondaries (especially continuation vehicles) are surging

• Private equity is moving into your retirement account

McKinsey & Company’s 2026 Global Private Equity Report

Buyout valuation multiples are at record highs. ❗️This is the single most important chart for anyone evaluating new PE commitments (am I dramatic enough?)

High entry prices = razor-thin margin for error. Sponsors need revenue growth, margin expansion, and cooperative exit multiples just to land in “acceptable returns” territory.

2. MSCI: Secondaries are on a Tear

And speaking of liquidity, in 2025, GP-led secondary volume hit $115 billion, with CVs accounting for roughly 43% of total secondary market volume.

❗️Nearly 75% of the largest global PE firms have now executed at least one continuation transaction.

None of this is inherently bad. But the pace and scale of CV activity is now large enough that it's starting to make its way to a variety of funds. If you're a secondaries investor, your exposure to CVs is growing whether you planned for it or not.

👉 Here’s your primer on CVs:

👉And here’s a fund with CVs on its books:

3. PE Is Coming for Your 401(k)

The battle for your retirement dollars is heating up.

Bloomberg reported this week that PE firms have acquired more than 900 independent financial advisory firms over the past decade:

Then in August 2025, Donald Trump signed an executive order directing the DOL, SEC, and Treasury to ease restrictions on alternative assets in retirement plans.

Asset managers are not sitting on their hands. According to EY, 90% of GPs are at least “somewhat interested” in developing defined contribution products, and 24% are already designing offerings.

👉 Thinking about PE exposure? Start here

2️⃣ Private Credit

TL;DR:

• OBDC II eliminated redemptions (semi-liquid met real stress)

• Defaults look contained, but PIK, LMEs, and 2026 maturities tell a more complex story

• Semi-liquids are on a tear

1. Blue Owl’s OBDC II: The Saga Continues

On February 18, Blue Owl announced it had sold $1.4 billion of direct lending loans across three of its BDCs to four North American pension and insurance buyers — at 99.7% of par.

OBDC II’s share: $600 million, roughly 34% of the fund’s portfolio.

👉 If you missed the deep dive, read that first. We walk through what remains in the portfolio, estimate which assets were sold, and get into the mechanics of how return of capital will actually work.

Now the kicker:

OBDC II is permanently replacing its quarterly tender offers with return-of-capital distributions.

Translation: investors can no longer request redemptions. Instead, everyone receives pro-rata distributions as the fund winds down.

This comes just three months after the failed merger with publicly traded OBDC:

OWL stock dropped ~10% on the news. Mohamed El-Erian asked publicly whether this was a "canary in the coalmine" moment. Blue Owl responded that they were "accelerating the return of capital, not halting redemptions." Technically, accurate, but not the same thing to investors…

2. Private Credit’s First Big Test: The Numbers Behind the Boom

S&P’s Within Intelligence published its 2026 private credit outlook, and the charts tell the whole story:

Semi-liquid private credit vehicles are capturing a larger share of new capital flowing into private markets. (Old news for long-time readers, but our subscriber base is up 43% in 90 days, so worth repeating for the recently arrived)

Here’s your primer on evergreen vehicles:

The earlier-mentioned MSCI report showed the same thing: look at the fund mix. The growth is concentrated in semi-liquid structures:

The appeal is obvious: lower minimums, simplified access, the promise of periodic liquidity. But let me remind you: the liquidity feature is wrapped around fundamentally illiquid loans.

When markets are calm and fundraising is smooth, gates stay open. When things go sideways - well, see the OBDC II story above.

A few data points from the report and elsewhere:

• The headline default rate in private credit has stayed below 2%. But once you include selective defaults and liability management exercises, the “true” default rate approaches 5%.

• Public BDCs now receive an average of 8% of investment income via PIK 👀
  

• 23 of 32 rated BDCs have unsecured debt maturing in 2026, totaling $12.7 billion — a 73% increase over 2025.

• Record credit secondaries fundraising in the first 3 quarters of 2025: $16 billion, including $5 billion+ raises from Coller Capital and Pantheon Ventures.

Speaking of the Coller fund, here’s the deep dive on it:

👉 New here? Want to learn more about private credit secondaries? Read this:

🐥 None of this means the sky is falling, btw. But the evergreen structure is new, and has not really been tested. OBDC II is the first high-profile case where the semi-liquid model met real redemption pressure in private credit. It probably won't be the last.

👉 In the real estate world, we had a well documented case with BlueRock:

👉 Invest in private credit? Here’s how you can learn to read the statements:

3️⃣ Commercial Real Estate

1. The Maturity Wall Isn’t a Wall Anymore (it’s a tunnel, with no light at the end just yet)

You’ve heard about the CRE maturity wall (are you sick of it yet?) Here’s where it actually stands.

$76.6 billion in CMBS loans are hitting hard maturity in 2026 (Trepp). These are loans where borrowers have already used up all extension options.

The broader picture: Morningstar estimates over $100 billion in total CMBS maturities in 2026, with roughly $57.7 billion likely to default at maturity.

Why? The math doesn’t pencil.

• The average rate on new CRE loans is 6.24%, vs 4.76% on the maturing debt. A property that was financed at 65% LTV five years ago may now appraise for 20–30% less, meaning new loan proceeds don’t cover the old balance. The gap has to come from somewhere (like fresh equity, mezz, or a discounted payoff).

👉 CRE investing 101: the relationship between cap rate and pricing:

By sector:

• Lodging now edges out office as the largest share of hard maturities at 20.5% (office: 20.1%).

• Office remains the deepest hole. Values have dropped 55.8% since issuance on CMBS-appraised properties. Among office loans that matured before 2026 and are still outstanding: 83.7% are delinquent and 92.7% are in special servicing (CoStar).

• Multifamily maturities surge 56% to $162.1 billion in 2026. But the distress here is vintage-specific: two-thirds of apartment foreclosures in H1 2025 involved 2021–2022 vintage loans with aggressive leverage.

2. NCREIF ODCE: Returns Up, But Capital Still Walking Out

Some green shoots in the institutional core real estate data.

The NFI-ODCE (the benchmark for open-end diversified core equity funds) posted a 3.54% gross total return for the year ended June 30, 2025: its best annual performance since Q4 2022.

• Income return: 4.15%

• Appreciation: -0.59%

In other words: you’re getting paid to hold, but values aren’t rising yet.

➡️ Now the capital flows:

Net investor cash flows remain negative: -$1.7 billion in Q2 2025, roughly flat quarter-over-quarter.

Over the trailing year:

• Contributions: $10.0B

• Distributions + redemptions: $19.0B

• Net outflow: $9.0B

The good news? The bleeding is slowing. Contributions are up 93.8% year-over-year. Redemption queues, which peaked at ~$41 billion in Q1 2024, have fallen to roughly $25 billion.

(Just in time for new redemption queues in private credit… am I right?)

On this bright note, I’ll sign off. Have a great week!

P.S. New here?

Check out some of our popular topics to get started: on private credit, private equity, and commercial real estate.

Thanks for reading! As always, if you have any suggestions, reply to this email, leave a comment, or find me on socials (unhinged me on X and a more tame me on LinkedIn)
-Leyla

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P.P.S. If you made it this far (and missed this meme earlier), enjoy:

1. A sale of $1.4B of direct lending investments at 99.7% of par, with OBDC II accounting for $600M, or roughly 34% of its total investment commitments.

2. Going forward, OBDC II is replacing its quarterly tender offers with return of capital distributions, meaning the redemption program is effectively done.

You can find the press release here. The headlines (here and here) were not kind. The market reaction wasn’t either: Blue Owl Capital (NYSE: OWL) was down 6% on 2/19.

The deep dive on OBDC II was published back in November, you should read it first to get familiar with the fund. All numbers are as fresh as you can get, since we are still waiting on the Q4 financials.

Here’s what we’ll cover today:

• What happened (I’m sorry to say it: the signs were sitting right there in the financial statements)

• What’s left in the fund (and why it doesn’t look nearly as pretty as it did before)

• Shocker of all shockers: portfolio overlap

👉 Interesting tidbit for y’all: the asset sale drew from all three funds. I compared the holdings of OBDC, OBDC II, and OTIC and identified 83 portfolio companies that overlap across all three, making them the most likely candidates for the assets that were sold. The full list is at the bottom of this post.

📚 Need a refresher on interval funds?

Quick reminder: this is not financial advice, nor a solicitation to sell securities. All information is shared strictly for educational purposes. Do your own due diligence.

Quick Recap

In November, Blue Owl proposed merging its non-traded BDC (OBDC II) into its publicly traded sibling, OBDC. OBDC II investors would have received OBDC shares based on NAV, but since OBDC traded at a ~21% discount to its own NAV, investors were looking at an immediate ~21% haircut if they wanted to sell.

The backlash was swift. Blue Owl reversed course within days.

The problem, however, didn’t go away. OBDC II had been bumping up against its 5% quarterly tender offer cap for several quarters:

The fund was selling assets and slowly shrinking to fund redemptions.

I swear, you can avoid a lot of unpleasant surprises by reading financial statements (and occasionally find pleasant ones). It ain’t rocket science, I promise. Start here:

What Just Happened

On February 18, Blue Owl announced that three of its BDCs, - OBDC II, OBDC, and Blue Owl Technology Income Corp (OTIC), - entered into agreements to sell a combined $1.4 billion in direct lending investments to four institutional buyers (North American pension funds and insurers).

➡️ OBDC II’s share: $600 million in total investment commitments, representing roughly 34% of the fund’s total portfolio.

What was sold:

• 92% first lien (senior secured, this is the safest stuff)

• 100% rated 1 or 2 on Blue Owl’s internal 5-point scale (the best quality ratings)

• 98.2% floating rate

• Spread across 96 portfolio companies and 25 industries (more on overlap later, you’ll be shocked lol)

• Weighted average spread of 5.5%

The sale price? Fair value, which came in at 99.8% of par. Kroll provided a fairness opinion.

Importantly, these aren't full position exits: each sale represents approximately 59% of OBDC II's exposure to the underlying portfolio company. The fund is keeping the other ~41% of each loan on its books.

In other words, Blue Owl sold the good stuff. At par.

Where the Money Is Going

OBDC II plans to use the proceeds to:

1. Pay down the revolving credit facility (~$11.8M outstanding)

2. Pay down the Goldman Sachs credit facility (~$275M outstanding)

3. Distribute cash to shareholders. This will be a return of capital of up to $2.35 per share, or approximately 30% of NAV as of year-end 2025

👉 If you invest in evergreen funds, keep an eagle eye on liquidity (I’m too tired to think of a good 🦅/🦉 joke at the moment, please drop yours in comments)

❗️The board also terminated the dividend reinvestment plan. Going forward, all distributions (including regular monthly dividends and future return of capital distributions) will be paid in cash only.

What’s Left Behind?

❗️This is the part that investors should pay attention to:

Read more

So by that logic, understanding how lenders make money (and how they pay you) is the third most useful skill.

In today’s post I’ll do my part to help you acquire that third skill.

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We’re going to walk through how to evaluate a private credit fund, whether it’s a $25M hard money vehicle or a publicly traded BDC with $9B in assets. For this case study, we’re using CRDEX because it’s a ’40 Act fund and we have access to full financials.

If you missed Part 1, it’s a bummer, because we dug into the notes to the financial statements: fund structure, valuation methodology, fees, leverage, and unfunded commitments. The notes tell you how the fund operates (they aren’t written to keep you awake, however).

Fear not, you can still read it - and I can almost guarantee you won’t fall asleep:

Today, we’re looking at the actual numbers.

“But Leyla, I HATE reading financial statements with a passion”

This is my answer to you:

I’ll walk you through how I do a first pass to get a sense of any given fund.

And at the end of this post (I really need you to read this), I’ll include the LLM prompts so you have no excuse to avoid statements ever again.

30% of NAV in this fund is equity tranches of CLOs. Here’s an article that explains what they are:

➡️ Before we go any further, you need to look at this chart.

The story told in this chart does not appear anywhere in the primary financial statements. It lives in the Schedule of Investments. And unless you love spreadsheets and self-inflicted suffering, you’re not building this with a calculator. You can, however, build it with AI.

I used NotebookLM to generate the loan maturity table and then turned it into a visual (it was more accurate than Claude, btw). Because I’m nice like that.

This chart matters enormously once we get to the cash flow statement. But I’m getting ahead of myself. Let’s start at the beginning.

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

The Balance Sheet (Statement of Assets and Liabilities)

TL;DR: I look at cost vs. marks, leverage, and cash. In that order.

I start here because it gives me the simple to grasp snapshot: what does the fund own, and what does it owe.

(Also, this is the first statement that appears in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs, and this sh*t is complicated enough, why make your life harder?)

1️⃣ Cost vs. Fair Value

As of June 30, 2025:

• Investments at cost: $1.041B

• Investments at fair value: $1.040B

That’s a net unrealized loss of ~$733K. (On a $1B portfolio, that’s basically noise).

We could have a long philosophical debate about marking Level 3 assets (and remember from Part 1, ~92% of this portfolio is Level 3). But the key takeaway is this: marks are fairly stable.

VERY IMPORTANT: always check whether the fund manager earns a performance fee on unrealized gains.

‼️ With CRDEX the incentive fee structure is explicitly limited to:

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Don’t get me wrong, I’m all for broadened access.

The trouble is, if the end investor is tasked with picking the fund, they’d better know what they’re doing.

Today, I’ll walk you through a high-level, first-pass review of a private credit fund’s financials. This isn’t a full deep dive. Think of it as a how-to you can use to evaluate similar offerings on your own.

❗ I’m not picking on StepStone (or Crowd Street, for that matter). I’m using a ’40 Act fund because the financials are publicly available. The framework is the same for Regulation D offerings (many hard money funds fall into that bucket). But in those cases, you’ll need to request the financials directly from the manager, ideally the last four quarters.

This post is Part 1. You’ll find Part 2 here:

Here are the first five things I check in the notes to the financial statements:

1. Fund structure

2. Valuation methodology

3. Fees

4. Debt

5. Unfunded commitments

Before you curl up in fetal position and start crying (or worse, stop reading), I’ve included LLM prompts at the end of this post to help translate the accounting mumbo-jumbo.

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

Background

StepStone Private Credit Income Fund (CRDEX) is an evergreen interval fund registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities Act of 1933, and domiciled in Delaware. It’s a new vehicle: operations commenced in June 2024.

There are no eligibility limitations: investors do not need to meet accredited investor criteria. A truly “democratized” offering.

👉 If you want a full evergreen fund refresher, start here:

The fund promises diversified private credit exposure, daily subscriptions, quarterly liquidity* (more on that below), low minimums, and 1099-DIV tax reporting.

Anyone who has dealt with K-1s understands the appeal of a 1099. (A sore subject in my household every April, but I digress.)

To their credit, StepStone makes it easy to find the annual and semi-annual reports: they're listed right on the fund website.

👉 If a fund you're evaluating doesn't do this, SEC filings aren't hard to find — this article has step-by-step instructions:

1. Fund Structure

Fund structure isn’t the most important thing, but it’s where I usually start.

Why? Because I want to know how old the fund is and whether it’s structured as an interval fund, a tender offer fund, or something else (It also happens to be the first section in the notes, which makes life easier).

👉 If you need a refresher on the structural differences, start here:

Back to CRDEX:

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What Cliffwater Argues

Cliffwater contends that recent skepticism around private debt is misplaced. Headline defaults and stress in public credit markets, they say, are being wrongly attributed to private strategies.

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They argue that private debt is structurally different: tighter documentation, stronger alignment, direct lender oversight, and tools like covenants, overcollateralization, and ring-fencing that are designed to protect lenders through cycles.

To help allocators evaluate risk consistently, they introduce a “Five Ws” framework:

• Who is borrowing

• What supports repayment

• When capital returns

• Where the lender sits in the capital structure

• Why the borrower needs capital

Anyone who has ever worked in lending will recognize this as Lending 101: a textbook how-to on loan underwriting.

In today’s guest post, Rachel Volynsky asks a question that goes several steps further:

What happens when the premise breaks?

-Leyla

About the author:

Rachel Volynsky is President of RVSK Advisory, where she advises family offices and institutional investors on asset allocation, portfolio construction, and private markets. Previously, she served as Chief Investment Officer at Mercer Global Investments Canada, overseeing $30 billion in multi asset solutions for pension plans, endowments, and family offices, and developing strategies to balance growth, capital protection, tax efficiency, and wealth transfer.

Her investment philosophy emphasizes judgment over fads, empirical evidence over noise, and resilience over short term performance. Rachel is a seasoned investor whose career includes senior roles at SEI Canada, Calvert Investments, Invesco Trimark, TD Asset Management, and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board. She holds an MBA from the Schulich School of Business and is a CFA Charterholder. Earlier in her career, she served as a Military Officer in a Strategic Intelligence Unit. You can find her on LinkedIn.

👉 Here are some Cliffwater deep dives:

When Assumptions Break: Five Questions on Private Credit Convergence

I came across this white paper and genuinely liked it. It offers a timely refresher on private credit fundamentals and clearly lays out the many flavors of the asset class, which is useful given how heterogeneous private credit has become. The paper rightly cautions against headline-driven conclusions, arguing that many critiques of private debt reflect a misdiagnosis. Safety, it reminds us, is not about yield or labels, but about the source of repayment and the structural protections put in place at origination. All of this is correct.

The paper then states that private debt is mistakenly conflated with BSL headline defaults and goes a long way toward reassuring us that the proverbial cockroaches are neatly contained within BSL.

They also graciously equip allocators with the “proper” due diligence questions to ask, anchored in a framework called the Five Ws. The stated goal is to re-anchor LPs due diligence around private credit lending fundamentals. The paper then explicitly argues that the Five Ws allow investors to evaluate private credit consistently across corporate, asset-based, and specialty lending, with an emphasis on portfolio construction, duration, capital structure, recovery, manager selection, diversification, and underwriting discipline. Again, this was very useful and timely.

Question One: What Happens When Assumptions Break?

Alas, somehow, reassured I was not, and I could not shake the feeling that I was being gently reprimanded for even having concerns. What felt unanswered to me was the question that matters most when cycles turn: what happens when assumptions break.

Yes, the framework works well in a world where markets remain segmented and behaviors remain distinct. But convergence is precisely the behavior that undermines this premise and is the source of my discomfort.

Maybe I am reading too much into it, but were we not told throughout the recent past about convergence? I understand that this narrative was meant to reassure investors that private credit still has ample room to grow at the expense of other credit providers, but it raises a more fundamental question. Does convergence also mean that once distinct credit providers are starting to look increasingly similar?

That appears to be the case according to Moody’s, which notes that historically separate pockets of credit are now serving overlapping borrower bases and competing on similar terms. In turn, borrowers are actively shopping between public and private markets, and documentation standards, while still differentiated on paper, are coming under pressure in practice. That may be what the other side of the convergence coin looks like.

Question Two: Are We Converging at an Inconvenient Moment?

That brings me to my second question.

Since 2020, capital inflows into private debt have accelerated meaningfully, with AUM rising from roughly $1.2 trillion in 2020 to about $2.3 trillion by 2025. That implies approximately $1.1 trillion of incremental capital entering the ecosystem over just 5 years, with the asset class projected to continue growing at a 13-15% annual clip through 2030, reaching roughly $4.5 trillion in AUM.

This expansion is occurring just as direct lending, the largest private credit borrower segment (~50%), is grappling with its own challenges, including growth pains, weak private equity exits, and subdued deal flow.

If that is the case, does it not follow that these newly converged players will be increasingly competing for the same limited pool of loans? Or maybe it is safe to assume that when capital floods the system, borrowers, structures, documentation, and lender behavior increasingly begin to resemble one another across BSL, private debt, and even public credit markets.

Question Three: Should We Be Watching the BSL and BDC Markets More Closely?

Which leads to my third question. If convergence is indeed underway, should we not be paying closer attention to signals coming from other parts of the credit ecosystem, such as the broadly syndicated loan market and, closer to home, the BDC space?

Transparency in private credit is not exactly abundant, given that opacity and illiquidity aren’t bugs; they are the asset class’s essential features. So, even if we accept that the assertion most recent slew of private credit critiques stemmed from comparison to BSL (which is not entirely accurate)¹ the dynamics in the BDC market are tougher to ignore.

As of early 2026, BDC markets were under visible pressure as public vehicles traded at persistent discounts to stated NAVs, exposing a widening gap between private valuations and public market clearing prices. Investor redemptions across large non-traded BDCs accelerated through late 2025 and early 2026, with withdrawals reaching roughly 5% of net assets in several vehicles.

The most visible episode involved Blue Owl Capital, which abandoned a proposed merger of a private BDC into a publicly traded one that was trading at roughly a 20% discount to NAV, followed by an increase in redemption limits at Blue Owl Technology Income Corp (OTIC) from 5% to 17%.

Separately, BlackRock TCP Capital disclosed significant loan write downs in early 2026, implying an expected NAV decline of nearly 20% and prompting an immediate share price repricing.

While each case had idiosyncratic drivers, together they suggest that where there is smoke, there is fire.

Question Four: If Markets Converge, Do Losses and Returns Converge Too?

This brings me to my fourth question, namely my concerns about credit quality, which is the defining feature of any form of credit.

Yes, admittedly, reported losses remain low. But if credit is credit, and if markets are converging, should losses in non-investment grade credit, whether private or broadly syndicated, not be higher and more consistent with historical averages and public credit outcomes?

Yes, the documentation is tighter we are told, but what about that PIK, NAV lending, CFO and continuation funds. I can ramble here some more, but you get the idea.

And that begs the follow up question, (perhaps most important one) if markets are converging, should returns not converge as well? If so, how am I meant to be compensated as an investor when losses are maybe rising, returns start to resemble those of public markets, while fees remain high? Yes, leverage has historically bridged that gap, but that’s yesterday’s news.

Question Five: Is Periodic Liquidity a Feature or a Bug?

And finally, my fifth question. What about that periodic liquidity embedded in many NAV based funds? Is that a feature or a bug?

The latest private BDC drama exposed a critical fault line, namely that liquidity in private credit is often conditional, not contractual. That liquidity functions well only at the pleasure of the underlying investors and trust can erode quickly once patience runs thin. Yes, for now, it is the domain of the BDC market, but aren’t we converging?

When It Stops Working as Advertised

The Five Ws framework explains how private debt is supposed to work. What it does not ask is how it behaves when it stops working as advertised.

Under those conditions, often facilitated and accelerated by convergence, the relevant diligence question is no longer just who the borrower is or where the lender sits in the capital structure, but how the strategy performs when correlations rise, exits stall, amendments proliferate, and liquidity becomes scarce.

So far, we have heard plenty of reassurance, but most of it comes from within the asset management ecosystem itself. A smaller and more independent set of voices does exist, including Moody’s, the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, and independent commentators, and they have not been shy about raising concerns. I would add my own voice to that independent camp.

I count myself as an experienced investor who understands how to construct a compelling narrative. But I can spot a good story with cracks from a mile away, and I am not shy about asking questions. My standard operating principle is trust but verify, and I would welcome suggestions on how to independently verify many of the claims embedded in this reassuring narrative, particularly given that limited transparency is a defining feature of private credit. I welcome pushback, objections, and additional substance.

For the avoidance of doubt, I like private markets, have invested in them, and expect to continue doing so selectively.

¹ First Brands and Tricolor originated as BSL credits, with later exposure shifting into private credit and BDCs.

👉 New here? Check out some of our popular topics to get started:

• private credit

• private equity

• commercial real estate

So obscure, in fact, that to fully understand what we’re discussing today, you’ll want to read the primer on asset-backed finance first. If you missed it, you’ll find it here:

For long-time readers, this chart will explain quite a bit:

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Today, we’ll do three things:

1️⃣ Break down the entity relationship and the fee layers
2️⃣ Look at what’s actually in the fund
3️⃣ Explain where returns are coming from

👉 Here’s another Apollo fund deep dive:

Disclosure: This case study is provided for educational purposes only and does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument. Nothing herein should be construed as legal, tax, investment, or financial advice. All opinions are my own and may change without notice. Readers should perform their own due diligence and consult qualified professionals before making any investment decisions.

The Pitch

Apollo Asset Backed Credit Company LLC (“ABC”), launched in September 2023, is a holding company investing in Asset-Backed Finance (ABF) assets. It operates as a continuous monthly private offering to accredited investors.

👉 If you want a full evergreen fund refresher, start here:

The entity structure is a thing to behold. Apollo, to their credit, posted a 208-page brochure (amply titled Form ADV Part 2A) that outlines various business practices (and the structural relationship between various entities):

ABC has two segregated investment series:

• Series I (taxed as a corporation)

• Series II (taxed as a partnership)

Both invest pro rata in the same underlying assets through wholly owned subsidiaries (effectively, this is the same strategy in different tax wrappers).

Apollo allocates capital across five buckets: consumer finance, residential mortgage loans, commercial real estate, hard assets, and financial assets.

💰 Annualized yield, you ask?

Series I: 4.5% to 5.6% (depending on share class)
Series II: 5.8% to 7.8%

🐎 Hold your horses, cowboys! We’ll take a look at where those distributions are actually coming from in a minute.

Liquidity & Tender Offers

Liquidity is offered via a quarterly Share Repurchase Plan:

• Repurchases capped at 5% of aggregate NAV per quarter

• Priced at prior quarter-end NAV

• Board has full discretion to scale back or suspend repurchases

For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, ABC repurchased 667,765 shares (~$17.1M).

Translation: quarterly liquidity windows, capped at 5%, and entirely at the Board’s discretion. If redemptions spike, you’re in line. This is standard for evergreen vehicles.

Watching liquidity is paramount in evergreens, friends. Here’s why:

Fees

Scroll back and take a look at the hierarchy of the entities. There are fees at pretty much every level. Let’s unpack:

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Today’s lineup:

1️⃣ Private equity: one endowment lowers return projections, lowest annual distribution rate on record, but hey, private assets are amazing (according to Apollo)!
2️⃣ Private credit: the SaaS bloodbath, and its effect on private credit funds
3️⃣ Commercial real estate: multifamily outlook (plus market-specific reports)

Before we dive in:

Accredited Insight delivers the LP’s perspective on private credit, private equity, and CRE, drawing on hundreds of deals, and thousands of conversations. Paid subscribers gain access to our database of over 30 case studies and articles on everything from evergreen funds to due diligence.

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1️⃣ Private Equity

TL;DR:

1. Princeton lowers its return expectations after years of heavy PE exposure.

2. Distributions are hitting historic lows relative to NAV.

3. Meanwhile, Apollo argues: private assets are awesome (are we surprised??)

Princeton University just slashed its long-term endowment return assumption from 10.2% to 8%, citing heavy exposure to crowded private equity markets and changing fundamentals (FT LINK). President Christopher Eisgruber added that even 8% “might be considered aggressive.” 🫠

After a record 47% return in 2021, Princeton has now posted two consecutive years of negative performance. Its 20-year rolling return has fallen from 14% in 2005 to under 10% in 2025.

Former CIO Britt Harris called it a reality check: “There is probably no way to hold a diversified portfolio and reach a double-digit return target over a long period of time… Princeton has just come down to what is normal.”

I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again: the Yale model worked in the ’80s and ’90s for one simple reason — there wasn’t a tidal wave of capital chasing deals. Buyouts were done at reasonable entry prices.

Today, small and mid-size businesses are being acquired at sky-high valuations, often with little margin for error. High entry prices make outsized returns harder to achieve (even with leverage, even with financial engineering).

Just look at this:

👉 Thinking about PE exposure? Start here

2. Hamilton Lane’s stupendous mid-year report

(they use memes! and interactive charts! - LINK). Two things caught my eye:

Distributions: in absolute dollars, distributions are near record highs. But as a percentage of NAV, they’re near record lows. LPs are getting money back, just not nearly enough relative to how much capital they’ve committed in recent years.

Exit pricing: in 2021, exit prices were about 10% higher than marks two quarters prior to exit. That premium is gone. Today, exits are happening at or near recent marks, not above them.

⚠️ And this one should give pause if you’re allocated to 2021–2022 vintage funds. Current holding multiples are higher than market-clearing prices for comparable assets.

3. This chart needs to be discussed, folks

This is from the Apollo Academy. Two things of note:

• First, equating risk with volatility is disingenuous when we all know volatility in private markets is largely laundered through infrequent marks.

• Second, what exactly is included in “total return”?
  If that number includes unrealized gains based on manager marks, then I’ll just chuckle in my corner.

2️⃣ Private Credit

TL;DR:

1. The SaaSpocalypse is bleeding into BDCs, and UBS warns private credit defaults could hit 13%.

2. Asset-Based Finance isn’t bulletproof after all.

3. Another private credit secondaries strategy enters the chat.

👉 New here? Want to learn more about PC secondaries? Read this:

UBS is warning that private credit may be more exposed to AI-driven disruption than investors realize (Bloomberg LINK). In an aggressive AI-disruption scenario, U.S. private credit default rates could rise as high as 13%.

The concern? AI accelerates business-model obsolescence, particularly in technology and services (these sectors make up an estimated 35% of the $1.7 trillion private credit market).

Private lenders are deeply intertwined with the AI build-out itself, financing everything from infrastructure to software through direct lending, asset-based finance, and structured credit. More than $200 billion of private credit is already tied to AI-related companies, and that figure is expected to multiply.

👉 Invest in private credit? Start here:

2. Even ABF takes a hit

Apollo took a previously unreported loss on part of a roughly $170 million asset-backed financing tied to Amazon brand aggregator Perch (LINK). It’s a rare setback for asset-based finance (ABF), a strategy Apollo has long positioned as safer than traditional private credit.

👉 What’s ABF? Read this:

The exposure was indirect, structured through credit facilities run by Victory Park Capital, with seniority and loss-absorbing protections in place. Still, Perch’s collapse resulted in losses booked about a year ago.

Apollo emphasized the loss was immaterial and that recoveries were meaningfully higher than those experienced by direct lenders.

3. Another private credit secondaries strategy

Add another entrant to the growing private credit secondaries universe.

Dawson Partners, a $25 billion AUM firm, announced plans to launch a strategy focused on the fast-growing credit secondaries market (LINK). The firm decided to formalize the strategy after participating in multiple secondaries transactions, including Crescent Capital’s continuation fund and the purchase of assets from the Hong Kong Jockey Club.

👉 I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again: there will be more private credit secondaries funds. Here’s a deep dive into one:

3️⃣ Commercial Real Estate

IPA published a 2026 multifamily investment forecast. You can find market-specific reports here.

🏢 National Overview
Rental demand is broadly balanced heading into 2026. Softer labor conditions pose greater risk to Class B and C assets, while Class A benefits from a sharp slowdown in new supply (hallelujah!).

🏦 Capital Markets
Capital availability is improving as banks re-enter the market and agency lending expands. 2026 cap rates are up more than 20%, creating more workable entry points.

Private equity activity is picking up, and recent rate cuts are easing financing conditions. Multifamily lending is projected to increase by more than 10% this year.

📈 Investment Outlook
Rate cuts, broader lender participation, and higher leverage are helping more deals pencil after a rebound in investment activity in 2025.

Long-term demand drivers remain intact. High in-migration Sun Belt metros continue to benefit from demographic tailwinds, while Northeast and Midwest markets are seeing tighter vacancies due to limited new supply.

🏢 Invest in real estate as a limited partner? Here’s our series on how to read a real estate pro forma.

New here?

Check out some of our popular topics to get started: on private credit, private equity, and commercial real estate.

Thanks for reading! As always, if you have any suggestions, reply to this email, leave a comment, or find me on socials (unhinged me on X and a more tame me on LinkedIn)
-Leyla

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